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Abstract  
This paper provides a simplified framework of focusing devices that generate different patterns of innovation, i.e., 
core-driven and bottleneck-removing innovations, and discusses the managerial implications. We show that core-driven 
innovation should be undertaken when technology components are independent (independent technology system), while 
bottleneck-removing innovation should be pursued when they are interdependent (interdependent technology system). 
Different types of focusing device should therefore be adopted based primarily on the degree of interdependence among 
technology components, which in turn maximizes underlying innovation probabilities. One of the implications of the 
results is that the effective management of innovation is made possible when innovative activities and corresponding 
focusing devices are appropriately arranged and coordinated to maximize innovation probability. We discuss these 
managerial challenges in terms of incentives, governance, and competitive strategies. 
Keywords: focusing device, independent technology system, interdependent technology system, core-driven innovation, 
bottleneck-removing innovation, innovation probability maximization  
JEL Classification: O31; O33; L2 
1. Introduction 
Today, it is widely accepted that the growth of technological knowledge is fundamental to the improvement of 
economic performance. According to Rosenberg (1994, 9), to further investigate the role of innovation in economic 
growth, two relevant questions must be answered: “What can be said about the manner in which the stock of 
technological knowledge grows over time?” And “To what factors is it responsive, and in what ways?” Satisfactory 
answers to these questions still have not been developed, at least through formal analysis.  
In industrial organization literature, the relationship between competition and innovation has been extensively studied 
both theoretically and empirically, stimulated by the famous Schumpeter hypotheses that emphasize a tradeoff between 
innovation and static efficiency
1
. However, since innovation has generally been modeled as an improvement of a single 
technology, rather than of multiple technologies, the direction of innovation has been relatively disregarded. Instead, the 
rate of innovation has been formalized and analyzed as the incentive problem of R&D investment. Thus, institutional 
factors that enhance this incentive, such as market power, patents, and regulation, were shown to increase the rate of 
innovation (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt 2008). 
This paper departs from these studies in that technology is regarded as a system of multiple component technologies 
and the direction of technological change among them is explicitly examined
2
. Rosenberg (1976) argued that the 
innovative efforts of entrepreneurs are directed to ease “the most restrictive constraint on their operation”. The 
restrictive constraints or technical bottlenecks force entrepreneurs to focus their attention on these areas because that is 
                                                        
1
 The Schumpeter hypotheses state that (1) innovation increases more than proportionately with firm size, and (2) 
innovation increases with market concentration. See Cohen and Levin (1989), Reinganum (1989), and Griliches (1984) 
for a survey and theoretical and empirical studies on the hypotheses. 
2
 Acemoglu (1998, 2002) also succeeded in providing a microfoundation for the theory of induced innovation under a 
general equilibrium framework. However, his model did not incorporate supply side constraints so that technological 
change proceeds in response to market forces alone. By contrast, this paper focuses more on the supply side constraints.  
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the compelling and obvious need. This allocation mechanism of innovative efforts was referred to as the “focusing 
device” by Rosenberg (1976), and it generates specific signals indicating precise directions in which technological 
efforts can be usefully focused.  
Hughes (1983) also proposed a similar concept of the “reverse salient” in studying the evolution of technology systems. 
Reverse salients are components that have fallen behind or are out of phase with other system components. Such 
components represent bottlenecks or backward elements that prevent the further advance of the system. The nature of 
these reverse salients can be technical, economic, organizational or political (Hughes 1987, 73). Reverse salients that 
cannot be overcome within the context of the existing system may bring about radical innovations and a shift in 
prevailing technological regimes. They therefore play the role of focusing device in the process of innovation, though 
the underlying economic mechanism has not yet been fully analyzed. 
In contrast, Harada (2014a) developed a model of focusing device in which the final good firm that purchases 
technology components adopts a pricing scheme, which in turn provides specialized suppliers with the incentive for 
R&D. It was shown that equilibrium factor prices are based on productivity, and that this reward scheme generates 
core-driven innovation. However, core-driven innovation stands in sharp contrast to the type of innovation pointed out 
by Rosenberg (1976) and Hughes (1983). Harada (2014b) therefore constructed an alternative model that results in 
bottleneck-removing innovation.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide a much more simplified framework of focusing devices that generate different 
patterns of innovation, i.e., core-driven and bottleneck-removing innovations, and discuss the managerial implications. 
Focusing devices are the mechanisms that determine the direction of innovation, which in turn consists of underlying 
technology systems, incentives, governance, and strategies. We show that core-driven innovation should be undertaken 
under an independent technology system, when the technology components are independent. Bottleneck-removing 
innovation should be pursued when the components are interdependent, under an interdependent technology system. 
Thus, different types of focusing device should be adopted primarily based on the degree of interdependence among 
technology components. This management of innovation activities maximizes underlying innovation probabilities. One 
of the implications of the results is that the effective management of innovation is made possible when innovative 
activities and corresponding focusing devices are appropriately arranged and coordinated to maximize innovation 
probability (the innovation probability maximization principle), instead of relying on elusive concepts such as 
enactments (Weick, 1979), resources (Wernerfelt, 1984), routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and capabilities (Teece et 
al., 1997). Thus, managing innovation probabilities is a key to dynamic efficiency of the firm.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model of focusing devices, examines their 
effects on the rate and direction of innovation, compares the relative dynamic efficiencies, and discusses the 
implications. Section 3 generalizes management of focusing devices as innovation probability maximization and 
discusses several managerial challenges. Finally, Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
2. Core-driven vs. Bottleneck-removing Innovation 
2.1 Technology System 
In this section, we will present a simple conceptual model of a technology system and show how interdependence of 
technology components affects the direction of innovation. We suppose a technology system consists of several 
technology components. For example, the railway vehicle technology system includes safety, drive control, power 
system, braking, vehicle motion, vehicle vibration, vehicle strength, energy control, communication and transmission. 
Each technology component is in turn divided into more detailed subcomponents.  
Suppose the value of innovation is V , and the probability of success of innovation for the i th technology component 
is denoted by  
    ; ,i i i ip r a q r a    (1) 
where 
ir  measures the amount of R&D investment and ia  is the intrinsic difficulty of R&D in this technology 
component.  q r  increases with R&D investment and is strictly concave to ensure interior solutions. If   0ip r  , 
we assume   0ip r   to rule out negative probabilities.  
Suppose a technology system consists of k  technology components. The heterogeneity across technology components 
is incorporated by assuming different values of ja  for 1, , .j k  For ease of exposition, we assume 
1 ka a  . The 1
st
 and the k th technology components are referred to as core and bottleneck technologies, 
respectively. This is because core technology usually implies a higher innovation probability while a bottleneck 
technology suffers from a lower innovation probability.  
To keep the model as simple as possible without loss of generality, we assume the function form of  q r  is the same 
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for all technology components. Now, we introduce two types of interaction among technology components, (1) 
independent technology components (modular type) and (2) interdependent technology components (complex products 
and systems (CoPS) type), and examine how the intensity of R&D investment is affected by these different interaction 
patterns.  
2.2 Independent Technology Components 
First, consider the case of independent multiple technology components. Suppose there are k  kinds of technology 
components. If each technology component is independent, the probability that at least one technology component 
succeeds in innovation is given by 
        1
1 1
, , 1 1 ; 1 1 .
k k
k j j i i
j j
p r r p n q q r a
 
          (2) 







p r r V r

   (3) 
When ia  is low (core technology), the expected gains from its innovation are higher than other technology 
components with higher values of ja  (bottleneck technology) because its marginal impact on the total innovation 
probability (2) is higher
3
. Therefore, it is more efficient to invest in core technology more intensively than bottleneck 
technology. As a result, core technologies are more likely to discover a new technology in this case. 
Proposition 1: In the case of independent technology components, core-driven innovation should prevail such that 
* *
1 Kr r   and    * *1 1; ;K kp r a p r a  . 
In other words, if each technology component has an independent effect on the total innovation probability, technology 
components with higher innovation probabilities should be intensively explored. Consequently, core-driven innovation 
prevails and technology divergence is more likely to expand over time. This result is consistent with innovation 
processes of general purpose technologies (GPT) such as machine tools and information technologies (see Helpman 
1998, for a systematic analysis). 
2.3 Interdependent Technology Components 
As a number of case studies of innovation suggest, innovation proceeds within larger sociotechnological systems 
consisting of interdependent technology components (Rosenberg, 1976; Hughes, 1983). Miller et al. (1995) and Hobday 
(1998) argued that while most innovation studies have examined mass-manufactured goods, a large number of 
industries supply high-cost, technology-intensive, customized, capital goods, such as flight simulation systems, bridges, 
chemical plants, robotics equipment, and submarines. They are systemic in the sense that they work through the 
interplay of many interacting components. They defined these technology systems as CoPS. In these CoPS, bottlenecks, 
rather than core technologies, play a more critical role. 
In this case, it is therefore reasonable to introduce interdependence across heterogeneous technology components. The 
innovation function can be specified as  
           
      1
1 1
, , ; .
k k
k j j j j
j j
p r r p n q q r a
 
        (4) 
This multiplicative form implies that the total innovation probability is severely damaged if the innovation probability 
of any one technology component decreases. For example, if  ; 0j jp n q  , the total innovation probability also 
becomes zero. In the additive specification of (2), this will not happen. In this case, R&D investment in other 
technology components with positive innovation probabilities does not make sense because the total innovation 
probability does not change as long as  ; 0j jp n q   is maintained. Thus, increasing  ;j jp n q  becomes the top 
priority
4
. As a result, bottleneck technologies should receive more R&D investment than core technologies in the 
interdependent case.  
Proposition 2: In the case of interdependent technology components, bottleneck-removing innovation should prevail 
such that 
* *
1 kr r  . 
Note that in this proposition, we cannot establish    * *1 1; ;K kp r a p r a   even if 
* *
1 kn n   holds. This is 
because more diversity does not necessarily lead to a higher innovation probability of the corresponding technology 
                                                        
3




q r a q r V

  . If ia  is minimized, this is 
maximized.  
4




p r a q r V

  If ia  is maximized, so is this.  
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component owing to the intrinsic difficulty ja . But the firm attempts to increase the innovation probability of 
bottleneck technologies as much as possible to increase the total innovation probability. Consequently, 
bottleneck-removing innovation prevails and technology convergence is more likely over time. This pattern of 
innovation is consistent with historical evidence provided by Rosenberg (1976) and Hughes (1983) in which bottlenecks 
or reverse salients play a critical role in determining the direction of innovation.  
2.4 Application to Capability Management in Two-tier Technology Systems  
These results can also be applied to capability management in more complex technology systems. To illustrate this, let 
us define core capability as technology components with the highest innovation probability, and peripheral capability as 
those with the lowest innovation probability. Standard capability management emphasizes core capabilities to be 
invested and improved, rather than peripheral ones. However, proposition 1 suggests that this management is effective if 
and only if the underlying technology system is independent. If technology components are interdependent, it is 
peripheral capabilities that must be highlighted in managing innovation processes. Thus, even in capability management, 
to derive effective managerial implications, innovation probability should be the basic unit of analysis in the face of 
uncertainty.  
In more complicated cases, suppose a technology system consists of two tiers of subsystems. The first and second tiers 
are either independent or interdependent. Then, we have four types of technology system, as shown in Table 1. Core 
capabilities should be highlighted only in the case that a technology system consists only of independent technology 
components. When an interdependent tier is included, peripheral capabilities should be prioritized in R&D investment 
at that tier. For example, suppose the first and second tiers consist of independent and interdependent technology 
components, respectively. While the first tier is managed primarily to increase core capabilities, peripheral capabilities 
should be improved in the second tier. Without introducing innovation probability as a measure for capability 
management, these subtle differences could not be derived.  
Table 1. Capability management in two-tier technology systems 
Types of technology systems Management focus 
Upper tier Lower tier Upper tier Lower tier 
Independent Independent Core Core 
Independent Interdependent Core Peripheral 
Interdependent Independent Peripheral Core 
Interdependent Interdependent Peripheral Peripheral 
3. Management of Innovation Probability 
3.1 Innovation Probability Maximization  
If the direction of innovation follows the optimal trajectory, as specified in propositions 1 and 2, this implies that the 
total innovation probability is also maximized. Thus, the optimality of innovation trajectory depends on whether the 
underlying innovation probability is maximized or not. We will refer to this as the innovation probability maximization 
principle. According to this principle, effective management of innovation is conceived as management of innovation 
probabilities. The previous section suggests that the patterns of interaction across technology components matter in this 
management.  
By contrast, the literature on R&D management typically focuses on knowledge (Kogt and Zanger, 1992; Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1994; Fleming, 2001), capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005), communications 
(Allen, 1977; Harada, 2003) or structures (Clark, 1985; von Hippel, 1990; von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Argyres 
and Silverman, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007) without much reference to innovation probabilities. But those factors are 
primarily conducive to the management of operational issues in which significant uncertainty does not exist. When 
stochastic processes must be effectively controlled, management of innovation should be directly concerned with the 
underlying innovation probabilities to be increased by corresponding innovative moves. 
Thus, innovation probability should be the unit of analysis in the face of uncertainty, and other factors such as 
knowledge and capabilities are instruments in the management of innovation probabilities. In other words, knowledge 
and capabilities should be efficiently utilized to increase innovation probabilities.  
However, in reality, the innovation probability maximization principle is sometimes difficult to implement owing to 
organizational practices, different pricing schemes, and a lack of attention to innovation probabilities. If these obstacles 
are significant, the management of innovation probabilities consistent with propositions 1 and 2 inevitably necessitates 
the management of focusing devices. Focusing devices can be defined as mechanisms of innovation that indicate the 
direction of innovation, such as technical signals, pricing schemes, and feedback loops. Harada (2014a) formalized 
focusing devices in terms of factor prices of technology components in which core technologies are priced highest, 
generating core-driven innovation, as suggested in proposition 1. If technology components are supplied through 
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markets with equilibrium factor prices, this implies that innovation probability maximization is discouraged under the 
interdependent technology system.  
Even if technology components are internally procured, divergence from innovation probability maximization can still 
take place. To overcome or transgress a reverse salient, it is crucial that firms are capable of defining them as a set of 
critical problems (Hughes 1983). However, this capacity to identify reverse salients under CoPSs is not always available. 
Rather, it must be developed and improved over time. For example, Dedehayir and Mäkinen (2008) discussed in their 
empirical study of the personal computer (PC) gaming industry that game developers, to guarantee success, tend to 
launch products with a focus on factors other than technological bottlenecks. They pointed out that the ability to gauge 
the magnitude of bottleneck severity in technological subsystems is likely to increase innovation performance. This 
argument suggests that conventional incentive schemes do not provide correct information that is conducive to 
innovation probability maximization. 
Similarly, Geyer and Davies (2000) suggested in their analysis of railway projects in the United Kingdom and Germany 
that successful innovation in market-based railway operations increasingly depends on dynamic systems integration and 
effective coordination between railway projects and the operational railway network. However, a fragmented market 
structure in the operational railway system makes it extremely difficult to build and maintain these links. Systematic 
efforts are required to establish some feedback loops between the two.  
These arguments clearly suggest that management of innovation probabilities should entail the management of focusing 
devices. The innovation mechanism that determines the direction of innovation should be corrected as soon as it 
diverges from the innovation probability maximization principle. More specifically, it is one of the most important 
challenges in the management of innovation to identify core and bottleneck technologies and direct innovative efforts so 
as to maximize innovation probability.  
Table 2 summarizes the management challenges of technology systems discussed in the previous section. This table 
indicates that incentives, governance, and strategies must be congruent with the underlying technology system to 
maximize innovation probability. Complementary sets of incentives, governance, and strategies constitute an efficient 
focusing device that achieves dynamic efficiency of the firm. In what follows, we will consider these management 
challenges.  
Table 2. Management of technology systems 
 Independent system Interdependent system 
Innovation Core-driven Bottleneck-removing 
Incentive Performance-based Marginal productivity-based  
Governance Internal development Relational outsourcing 
Strategy Cost-reducing, quality-improving Hybrid 
Advantage Core strength Flexibility 
Disadvantage Rigidity Core weakness 
3.2 Incentives 
First, management of focusing device requires appropriate incentive schemes that facilitate desirable innovation. In 
market transactions, core technology is usually characterized by high quality, relative to other technology components. 
Bottleneck technology is usually rewarded less than other technology components as otherwise, suppliers of technology 
components, including both employees and outside suppliers, are not motivated to improve quality. On the contrary, 
they have more incentive to reduce quality because the corresponding payment increases as a result. Bottleneck 
technology should therefore be rewarded less than other technology components. This is the equilibrium price schedule 
in the model of focusing device in Harada (2014a). 
In the case of independent technology components, since core technology must be primarily developed, higher rewards 
should be provided to suppliers of core technology to facilitate innovation. A decrease in the innovation reward 
obviously reduces the incentive to make R&D investments in core technology, and hence, discourages innovation.  
In the case of interdependent technology components, however, the difficulty arises in incentive schemes. According to 
proposition 2, the optimal incentive scheme should be a reversed version of core-driven innovation, i.e., a marginal 
productivity-based reward. Consequently, suppliers of bottleneck technology are less motivated to invest in R&D. The 
management challenge here is to introduce a marginal productivity-based reward scheme in the firm without 
discouraging innovation and providing an incentive to downgrade quality. However, this is sometimes very difficult to 
implement via selective intervention (Williamson, 1985) because employees and suppliers of high quality technology 
components face high reservation utility. If they are rewarded less, they will leave the firm. 
To respond to this challenge, the firm often introduces a different reward scheme for bottleneck technologies. For 
example, if core technology is internally procured, bottleneck technology is outsourced so that the negative effect on 
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employees’ incentive to make R&D investment is mitigated by separating the reward schemes.  
Alternatively, the firm can adopt a fixed reward scheme so that all technology components are equally motivated for 
innovation. But this cannot resolve the potential problem of incentive incompatibility because employees in charge of 
bottleneck technology could have more bargaining power than other employees, demanding more nonpecuniary 
incentives such as promotion and budget. Once again, this might discourage innovative activities of other employees to 
some extent. Ideally, if the incentive scheme can feasibly reward lower quality, this facilitates bottleneck-removing 
innovation. Otherwise, the firm must introduce either different governance for bottleneck technology or a fixed reward 
scheme as second best alternatives.  
3.3 Governance 
We must now examine the governance required for core and other technologies to fix the appropriate reward scheme for 
bottleneck technology. Core technology reflects the core capability of the firm, and the resource-based view of 
management recommends that core technology should be internally procured. If it is outsourced, this implies 
competitors can also get access to core technology, leading to a decline in competitive advantage. To outperform 
competitors, the firm must own valuable, rare, inimitable, and well-organized resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991). 
Obviously, core technology satisfies this criterion.  
From the perspective of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), internalization of core technology implies 
relation-specific investment in core technology is also facilitated. As a result, innovation in core technology is 
facilitated. In this case, if the firm pursues core-driven innovation, it should adopt a performance-based (average 
productivity) reward scheme. In other words, innovation in high quality technology components will be rewarded more. 
Employees in charge of core technology will become highly motivated to innovate.  
However, from the perspective of innovation probability maximization, it is not always desirable to internalize core 
technology. Although transaction cost minimization is efficient from a static perspective, another aspect needs to be 
considered from a more dynamic perspective, namely, to maximize the total innovation probability. To clarify this, 
suppose the i th technology component is currently outsourced and the firm is now considering whether it internalizes 
this technology component or not. When a technology component is outsourced, outside suppliers make the 
corresponding R&D investment.  
If this technology component requires relation-specific investment to the firm, outside suppliers have less incentive to 
make the R&D investment, which could be reflected in a lower value of V  in (3). For example, the firm uses 
packaged software from the outside supplier, but its productivity increases if the software is more customized. The firm 
must internally develop the customized software because outside suppliers have no incentive to do so. If the firm 
succeeds in the customization, it increases the value of its technology system (V ) so that I OV V  holds where 
subscripts I  and O  denote internal procurement and outsourcing, respectively. From a static perspective, this 
decision is optimal as I OV V , from the relation-specific investment.  
Now, assume that the innovation probability of the i th technology component is exogenously given when it is 
outsourced. If many outside suppliers investing in R&D in this technology component exist in the market, the 
corresponding innovation probability is expected to be higher than the innovation probability of the firm. Assume also 
that innovation increases V  over time and the growth rates under outsourcing and internal procurement are O  and 
I , respectively, with O I  . The expected sum of the future gains from innovation is higher under outsourcing 
than under internal procurement if the gap between the innovation probabilities ( O  and I ) is sufficiently large
5
.  
In particular, GPT components are most likely to be outsourced since outside GPT suppliers provide them with lower 
prices through economies of specialization (Rosenberg, 1976). The emergence of GPT sectors provides the firm with 
the option of outsourcing with higher level and growth effects (Harada, 2010). While internal procurement could be 
efficient from the static perspective, it could be inefficient from the dynamic perspective. Under certain conditions, the 
firm faces a tradeoff between commitment (relation-specific investment) and innovation probability. In other words, the 
tradeoff emerges between static and dynamic efficiencies. For the latter, the innovation probability maximization 
principle should be more pronounced. 
If core technology has to be outsourced owing to more rapid pace of innovation outside the firm, the reward scheme 
simply becomes market prices. As we mentioned above, core technology is rewarded more than other technology 
components in markets. Thus, if the firm intends to implement core-driven innovation, a market pricing scheme is 
complementary. However, outsourcing also involves the risk of losing competitive advantage because competitors can 
also get access to the same core technology. This is indeed what is observed in the PC industry in which core 
                                                        
5
 More formally, this condition is given by O O I IV r V r     where r  denotes a discount factor.  
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technologies such as operating systems and MPU are outsourced respectively to Microsoft and Intel so that product 
differentiation in this industry remains harder to achieve. In this case, a technology component with the second highest 
quality might become the source of competitive advantage. But if this technology component is also subject to a rapid 
pace of innovation in the market, it must be outsourced once again to maximize innovation probability. This technology 
component cannot be the source of competitive advantage, as long as outside suppliers are available to competitors. 
Eventually, if the firm pursues core-driven innovation and gains sustainable competitive advantage, technology 
components as the source of competitive advantage must be internalized to block imitation by competitors.  
By contrast, if the firm pursues bottleneck-removing innovation with the interdependent technology components, 
bottleneck technology becomes the source of competitive advantage. Once again, the optimal governance should be 
determined based on the innovation probability maximization principle. If outside suppliers provide the bottleneck 
technology with a rapid pace of innovation, the firm should obtain it from outside suppliers. If competitors regard the 
same technology component as a bottleneck and pursue bottleneck-removing innovation, outsourcing implies the loss of 
competitive advantage. In this case, the second lowest quality technology component becomes the source of competitive 
advantage. Eventually, bottleneck technology as the source of competitive advantage must be either internalized or 
outsourced to suppliers establishing a specific relation to the firm.  
Regarding outsourcing to a relation-specific supplier, note that bottleneck technology is priced lowest in the markets. In 
contrast to core technology, outside suppliers also face less incentive to invest in R&D. On the other hand, the firm 
pursuing bottleneck-removing innovation has the incentive to invest heavily in R&D in the bottleneck technology. 
Consequently, the firm can provide sufficient incentives and governance mechanisms such as relational contracts. In 
this case, competitors cannot get access to the same bottleneck technology. This relational contract is likely to be 
unfeasible in the case of core technology because the opportunity costs of core technology in the market are high, so 
that the firm cannot provide sufficient incentive to these suppliers.  
Suppose the marginal productivity-based reward scheme cannot be implemented in the firm. When a bottleneck 
technology is either internally procured or outsourced to relation-specific contractors, higher quality technology 
components should be outsourced and rewarded according to market prices. The remaining lower quality technology 
components are rewarded based on a fixed reward scheme in the firm. When the bottleneck technology is outsourced to 
relation-specific contractors, more incentives should be provided to those contractors to facilitate R&D investment.  
3.4 Competitive Strategies 
Innovation probability maximization leads to sustainable competitive advantage or dynamic efficiency over time. To 
fully exploit dynamic efficiency, the corresponding competitive strategy must be congruent with the underlying 
focusing device.  
In contrast to competitive strategies proposed by Porter (1996)
6
, Harada (2014b) introduced the concept of dynamic 
strategies that refer to innovation trajectories of given competitive strategies. For example, the competitive space 
represented in Figure 1 is specified by two axes: quality and cost advantage. A consumer chooses a bundle of these two 
properties of the product from the set of available alternatives. Its utility is assumed to be well-behaved and the profits 







Figure 1. Innovation trajectories 
If the firm is positioned on A in this competitive space (see Figure 2), this position is equivalent to Porter’s competitive 
strategy. However, innovation enables the firm to shift its own position to somewhere that increases the consumer’s 
utility. In Figure 2, three types of innovation trajectories are identified: (1) quality-improving; (2) cost-reducing; and (3) 
hybrid strategies. Harada (2014b) argued that while the hybrid strategy is associated with Porter’s stuck-in-the-middle 
strategy, which pursues both differentiation and cost leadership simultaneously, this dynamic strategy alone generates 
                                                        
6
 Porter (1996) defined competitive strategy as “the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set 
of activities”.  
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Figure 2. Three types of dynamic strategies 
Figure 3 shows that the quality-improving strategy of AB is inferior to the hybrid strategy of AA' because U'>U holds. 
Indeed, this figure indicates that both positions of A and B provide the same utility to the customer. Paradoxically, if 
quality-improving innovation continues from A to B, its competitiveness remains the same, whereas if it stops 
somewhere before reaching B, the firm improves its competitive advantage. However, as long as the firm stays in the 
trajectory of AB, it cannot gain competitive advantage over competitors in AA'. Therefore, the firm should eventually 









Figure 3. Shifts in competitive advantages and innovation trajectories 
Now, suppose the firm adopts a hybrid strategy. Then, the corresponding technology system should be interdependent 
because a balanced innovation trajectory must be realized under this strategy. If the firm is currently advancing in cost 
performance, its next target of innovation should be quality-improving because the hybrid strategy pursues cost 
reduction and quality improvement simultaneously. This simultaneous pursuit is only possible by bottleneck-removing 
innovation.  
On the other hand, if the firm pursues either cost-reducing or quality-improving strategies, it should focus on innovation 
in cost reduction or quality improvement, respectively. Obviously, an independent technology system is complementary 
to these dynamic strategies because it generates core-driven innovation.  
Thus, our results in propositions 1 and 2 clearly suggest that structure (technology system) follows strategy (dynamic 
strategy) consistently. If the firm shifts its dynamic strategy between a hybrid and single strategy, the underlying 
technology system must also be altered to one that is complementary to the new dynamic strategy.  
3.5 Endogenous Technological Interdependence  
So far, we have simply assumed that technology systems can be classified as either independent or interdependent 
technology components. This interdependence among technology components is primarily determined by the 
technological properties of the underlying architecture of the product (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Although the effect 
of architecture is significant on the degree of interdependence among technology components, the firm could affect this 
interdependence to some extent by changing incentive schemes and dynamic strategies. 
For example, automobile firms are usually equipped with an interdependent technology system because an automobile 
is composed of many interdependent parts and materials. According to Table 2, automobile firms must pursue a hybrid 
strategy with bottleneck-removing innovation. Toyota seems to follow this innovation path with relation-specific 
keiretsu suppliers. However, Honda, BMW, and Mercedes put more emphasis on distinguishing features of their own 
cars such as design, engine performance, quality, and usage. Thus, their dynamic strategies are quality-improving, rather 
than hybrid. This clearly implies that these automobile firms succeed in generating unique focusing devices that are not 
implied by the underlying (pure) technology system. Although their technology systems are also subject to high degrees 
of interdependence among technology components, they put more emphasis on the independent nature of product 
properties that appeal to customers, a type of focusing device can be endogenously determined in the competitive 
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strategy space, even if the firm and competitors share the same technology system. Hence, we should distinguish the 
strategic technology system from the pure one. The former is the endogenously-designed innovation mechanism, while 
the latter is the exogenously-predetermined technical relationships across technology components. Obviously, the 
former alone matters in managing innovation probabilities. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In response to the two questions raised by Rosenberg (1994), we have developed a simple framework of focusing 
devices. We have shown that core-driven innovation should be undertaken with independent technologies, while 
bottleneck-removing innovation should be pursued under the interdependent technology system. These results provide 
an answer to the first question of Rosenberg (1994) about the manner in which the stock of technological knowledge 
increases. 
In the process of innovation, we inevitably face the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency implied in the 
Schumpeter hypotheses. Thus, institutional designs such as the boundary of the firm must be evaluated in terms of the 
innovation probability maximization principle, in addition to the transaction cost minimization principle. A standard 
economic institutional analysis such as transaction cost economics is primarily concerned with static efficiency, 
represented by underinvestment in relation-specific assets (Williamson 1985). However, dynamic consideration 
modifies this preoccupation with static efficiency in favor of dynamic efficiency.  
Thus, Rosenberg’s (1994) second question, about the factors to which technological knowledge is responsive, can now 
be answered by pointing out not only economic factors such as factor prices but also institutional factors that reflect 
either the transaction cost minimization principle or the innovation probability maximization principle. This paper 
illustrates the need to shift our attention towards the latter in the evaluation and design of institutions.  
The results obtained in this paper have several implications. They suggest that R&D management literature that 
emphasizes knowledge and capabilities should be evaluated in terms of the effects on innovation probabilities, and used 
to increase innovation probabilities, based on these evaluations. This is because the existing studies on R&D 
management lack appropriate measures. As illustrated in Table 1, even in capability management, to derive effective 
managerial implications, innovation probability should be the basic unit of analysis in the face of uncertainty.  
In terms of the literature on focusing devices, this paper has formalized the informal arguments in Rosenberg (1976) 
and Hughes (1983), and integrated their concepts of bottlenecks and reverse salients with the core-driven innovation 
suggested by Harada (2014a) in a very simple framework of focusing devices. A number of case studies on innovation 
processes have been built upon the framework of reverse salients (Geyer and Davies, 2000; Prencipe, 2000; Fransman, 
2001; Mulder and Knot, 2001; Christiansen and Buen, 2002; Markard and Truffer, 2006; Dedehayir and Mäkinen, 
2008). However, these arguments seem valid only in interdependent technology systems such as CoPS. Thus, the model 
in this paper provides a more balanced view on the innovation processes.  
Finally, let us make a few remarks on dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities are the ability to build, integrate, or 
reconfigure other resources and capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), which consists of routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Innovation probability is also concerned with building, integrating, and reconfiguring other resources and capabilities as 
long as they are related to innovation.  
However, innovation probability should be clearly distinguished from dynamic capabilities because innovation 
probability is not a routine. It is one aspect of controlled stochastic processes and changes over time. Innovation 
probability is the outcome of stochastic events and actions, which in turn might reflect dynamic capabilities. This paper 
was not interested in linking innovation probability and dynamic capabilities. As Williamson suggested, the related 
work has not yet succeeded in operationalizing dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities, as the framework of 
management of innovation, are too elusive to provide specific prescriptions regarding innovation activities. Instead of 
relying on dynamic capabilities, we therefore believe that it is more instructive to make innovation probabilities the 
basic unit of analysis for innovation strategy and management.  
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